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Abstract—New methods that exploit sparse structures arising
in smart grid networks are proposed for the state estimation
problem when data injection attacks are present. First, con-
struction strategies for unobservable sparse data injection attacks
on power grids are proposed for an attacker with access to all
network information and nodes. Specifically, novel formulations
for the optimization problem that provide a flexible design of the
trade-off between performance and false alarm are proposed.
In addition, the centralized case is extended to a distributed
framework for both the estimation and attack problems. Different
distributed scenarios are proposed depending on assumptions
that lead to the spreading of the resources, network nodes and
players. Consequently, for each of the presented frameworks a
corresponding optimization problem is introduced jointly with an
algorithm to solve it. The validity of the presented procedures
in real settings is studied through extensive simulations in the
IEEE test systems.
Index Terms—Smart grid security, false data injection, dis-
tributed optimization, sparse models, attack detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power networks are complex systems consisting of gen-
erators and loads that are connected by transmission and
distribution lines [1]. These systems can be modeled by
complex networks, in which the generators and loads are
represented by physically distributed nodes and power lines
are represented by edges that connect the nodes. Because of
the geographic and physical distribution of the nodes and the
power transmission constraints [2], various structural proper-
ties of complex networks are observed in power networks [3].
For instance, the distribution of electrical distances of Eastern,
Western and Texas interconnects in the North American power
network obeys a power-law distribution, which leads to scale
free and hierarchical network structures [3].
The aforementioned structural properties of power networks
constrain the way in which both attack and defense schemes
are designed for the smart grid. Several attack vector con-
struction and detection methods have been introduced using
either centralized [1], [4], [5], [6] or distributed [7], [8] models.
Data sparsity properties have been analyzed for constructing
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unobservable sparse attack vectors by Liu et al. [1]. Kosut et al.
[5] have introduced the relationship between attack detectabil-
ity and network observability using a graph-theoretic model.
Xie et al. [9] proposed a distributed wide-area state vector
estimation algorithm which is also employed for bad data
detection [7]. However, they do not exploit the sparsity and
instead they define the state estimation problem as a weighted
least squares (WLS) problem. Pasqualetti et al. [10] solved
a similar WLS problem using a measurement distributed
decomposition method for distributed state estimation and
attack detection. Yang et al. [11] have proposed a hierarchical
architecture to construct sparse attack vectors using combi-
natorial search methods. Vukovic et al. [12] have analyzed
various mitigation schemes of data integrity attacks for state
estimation. Recent advances for attack vector construction and
state vector estimation methods in power systems have been
reviewed in [13] and [14].
The centralized attack schemes proposed in this paper
follow the undetectability criteria given in [1]. First, sparse
targeted false data injection attacks are introduced which
provide a strategy for tampering with the measurements from
meters in order to build a specific data injection vector. In
the second proposed method, called strategic sparse attacks,
the sparse attack vector is constructed by assuming that the
attacker has control over only a set of measurements and that
the system has secure measurements that cannot be considered
in the construction of the attack vector.
Since power grid networks are large scale networks, system
monitoring and security control as envisioned for the smart
grid are challenging problems. Therefore, decentralized op-
tions in which the computational complexity is distributed
throughout the network are desirable. For this reason, dis-
tributed estimation techniques arise as strong candidates to
incorporate adaptability to dynamic network topologies and
flexible reconfiguration in case of sub-network faults. Addi-
tionally, distributed estimation techniques do not require all
network state information to be available to each group, which
facilitates operating with limited knowledge about the state of
the network. However, the distributed structure of the networks
may lead to critical attacks. For instance, distributed and
collective attacks to active nodes, which have higher numbers
of connections than the rest of the nodes, may cause larger
damage to the network (i.e., the group of nodes connected
to active nodes), because of its scale-free and hierarchical
2structure [3], [15].
We introduce two distributed attack models that make use of
the sparsity of the attack vectors. The first model, Distributed
Sparse Attacks, assumes that the attacks are directed at clusters
of measurements. In this setting, attackers have access to a
subset of the measurements observed by the nodes in the
cluster. The goal is to achieve a consensus on the design
of the attack vectors by iteratively computing them for the
measurements observed in each cluster. The second model,
Collective Sparse Attacks, assumes that the network topology
is known by the attackers and may access the measurements
observed in the whole network. However, attacks occur in
groups, i.e., state variables in the same group are attacked
by the same attack vectors.
In addition, we introduce two distributed state vector estima-
tion methods from the perspective of the network operator. The
first method, Distributed State Vector Estimation, considers
the scale-free or hierarchical structure of the network, i.e., the
observed measurements are grouped into clusters. Then, local
state vector estimates are computed using local measurements
by either local network operators or smart Phasor Measure-
ment Units (PMUs). Using an iterative message-passing sparse
optimization algorithm, each local operator or unit sends
the estimated state vectors to centralized network processors,
which update the state vector estimates. The second method,
called Collaborative Sparse State Vector Estimation, assumes
that different vector operators estimate a subset of state
variables. For instance, different network operators may have
expertise or special tools in order to estimate specific state
variables and as a result, state vector variables are assumed
to be distributed in groups and locally accessed by network
operators. In this method, each network operator computes an
estimate of the subset of the state variables using local data,
and these estimates are then sent to a centralized operator in
order to update their values. We analyze the proposed state
vector estimation methods for attack detection and identifica-
tion using a residuals test method in Section VII.
All the optimization problems presented in this paper are
solved using the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
(ADMM) algorithm [16]. Parameter and stopping criteria
selection methods of ADMM are given in [16] and [17].
Moreover, convergence properties of ADMM are analyzed in
[16] and [18].
In the next section, we review the unobservable false data
injection and state vector estimation problems. Section III
describes centralized sparse attack methods in which the sparse
structure of the problem is exploited. In Section IV, we
introduce distributed and collaborative state vector estimation
methods. We introduce distributed and collective sparse attack
models in Section V, and their computational complexity is
analyzed in Section VI. We assess the validity of the proposed
methods using real-world power systems in Section VII. The
paper concludes with Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
A review of the problem formulation of false data injection
attacks and the state vector estimation problem for attacked
systems follows. Consider the DC power flow state acquisition
problem [1] given by
z =Hx + n, (1)
where z ∈ RN is the vector of measurements, x ∈ RD is the
state vector which consists of the voltage phase angles at the
buses, H ∈ RN×D is the measurement Jacobian matrix and
n ∈ RN is the measurement noise.
The goal of the network operator is to estimate the state
vector and decide whether an attack is present. If the noise is
normally distributed with zero mean and independent compo-
nents, then the following estimator can be employed [1]:
xˆ = (HTΛH)−1HTΛz , (2)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are
given by Λii = ξ−2i , and ξ2i is the variance of the i-th
measurement for i = 1, ...,N . The network operator decides
that an attack is present if ∥z −Hxˆ∥2
2
> τ , where ∥ ⋅ ∥2 is the
ℓ2-norm and τ ∈ R is a given threshold. If ∥z−Hxˆ∥22 ≤ τ then
no attack is declared.
The goal of the attacker is to inject a false data vector
a ∈ RN into the measurements without being detected by the
operator. Since the attack is performed by changing the values
of a subset of all the measurements, the resulting observation
model for the operator is
z˜ =Hx + a + n. (3)
Note that for the attack vector ai ≠ 0, ∀i ∈ A, where A is the
set of measurement variable indices with which the attacker
tampers. On the other hand, the measurements over which the
attacker has no control are the secure variables, ai = 0, ∀i ∈ S.
Note that S = A¯ where (¯⋅) is the set complement operator and
∣A∪S ∣ =N where ∣ ⋅ ∣ denotes set cardinality.
Imposing the constraint a =Hc, where c ∈ RD is an injected
data vector guarantees undetectability via residual tests since
it lies in the column space of H [1], [5]. Note that (3) can be
rewritten as
z˜ =Hx˜ + n, (4)
where x˜ = x + c is what an operator unaware of the attack
tries to estimate instead of the actual state vector x.
B. Sparsity in the System
Assuming that an attacker can tamper with a limited number
of meters poses the optimization problem in a framework in
which the attack vector is sparse. Specifically, if k meters
are controlled by the attacker, then a is at most k-sparse,
i.e., ∥a∥0 ≤ k, where ∥ ⋅ ∥0 is the l0 norm. In [1] Liu
et al. prove the existence of unobservable attack vectors if
k ≥ N −D +1. Finding the sparsest attack vector that satisfies
a =Hc is computationally intractable in general. Surprisingly,
the solution can be relaxed into a convex optimization problem
by using the ℓ1-norm as the objective function instead of the
ℓ0-norm [19], [20]. Based on sparse reconstruction techniques,
Kim and Poor [4] provide a greedy approach for the attack
vector construction when a subset of the measurements is
controlled by the attacker while the remaining measurements
are secured.
3A second scenario in which the sparsity of the system can be
exploited is in the estimation of the state vector. Considering
that system states are given by a random process {xt}, the
components of the state vector that change significantly during
an interval (t, t′) are defined as
Xt,t′ = {i ∶ ∣xt(i) − xt′(i)∣ ≥ ǫ} (5)
where ǫ defines the threshold for change significance. That
being the case, the operator does not need to estimate all state
variables for each time t. Assuming that it has a previous
state estimate, xˆt, from time t, it can estimate the values that
changed above the ǫ threshold by realizing that
yt′ − yt =Hxt′ −Hxˆt + zt′ − zt (6)
=H(xt′ − xˆt) + zt′ − zt (7)
=Hδt,t′ + zt′ − zt, (8)
where δt,t′ = xt′ − xˆt has significantly changed variables given
by indices Xt,t′ . By choosing the significance threshold, ǫ, and
the estimation time interval appropriately, δ becomes a nearly
sparse vector whose k largest components can be recovered by
solving a standard compressed sensing problem of the form
minimize ∥δ∥1
subject to ∥yt′ − yt −Hδ∥22 < γ, (9)
where γ is a regularization parameter.
An additional optimization constraint is imposed by the rank
deficiency observed in the measurement Jacobian matrix H of
several IEEE test systems, such as the IEEE 39-Bus [21]. In
Table I, we show the values of N , D, rank and R (the ratio
of the number of nonzero elements of the entries of H) for
test systems. We observe that 9-Bus, 14-Bus, 30-Bus and 39-
Bus test systems are rank deficient. Although H matrices of
57-Bus, 118-Bus, 300-Bus and 3375-Bus test systems are not
rank deficient, their R values are greater than those of the
rank-deficient matrices. Note that the sparseness increases as
the system size increases. Following the sparse nature of the
system, (3) and (4) are formulated as ℓ1-norm optimization
problems [4].
TABLE I: Rank values of measurement Jacobian matrices of
IEEE test systems and the 3375-Bus Polish system plus -
winter 2007-08 evening peak system.
System N D Rank R
9-Bus 19 9 8 72.00 %
14-Bus 34 14 3 80.25 %
30-Bus 71 30 29 90.89 %
39-Bus 85 39 38 93.27 %
57-Bus 137 57 57 95.22 %
118-Bus 304 118 118 97.64 %
300-Bus 711 300 300 99.09 %
3375-Bus 7536 3375 3375 99.92 %
III. CENTRALIZED DATA SPARSE ATTACKS
A. Sparse Targeted False Data Injection Attacks
Targeted False Data Injection Attacks consist of attackers
constructing false data injection vectors a corresponding to
a given attack vector c. In this section, we introduce two
models that employ LASSO and regressor selection algorithms
to solve the targeted false data injection problem.
1) Targeted LASSO Attacks: The sparseness of c is ex-
ploited for targeted false data injection attacks [1], where
cj ∈ R are fixed and defined by attackers ∀j ∈ I, for a
set I of indices of the state vector variables that will be
attacked. However, cj ∈ R are randomly selected by the
attacker according to a probability distribution ∀j ∈ I¯ , where
I¯ is the set of off-target variables which are not specifically
determined by the attackers. In other words, the attackers do
not have control on the variables cj ∈ I¯ . Note that, ∣I∪I¯ ∣ =D.
In order to compute the off-target and targeted attack
vectors, we employ the following decomposition [1]:
a =Hc = ∑
i∈I¯
cihi + ∑
j∈I
cjhj , (10)
where hl is the l-th column of H. Then, we define a sub-
matrix HI¯ of H as HI¯ = (hji ,⋯,hjD−∣I¯∣), ∀ji ∈ I¯ and 1 ≤
i ≤D − ∣I ∣ [1] and construct a vector b in the range space of
the attacked measurements, such that b = ∑j∈I hjcj . Using
this construction, we relate b to the measurements HI¯ , such
that PI¯ = HI¯(HI¯THI¯)−1HI¯T , BI¯ = PI¯ − I and y = BI¯b
[1]. Therefore, we can compute a by solving y = BI¯a [1].
We assume that given an attack vector a, the attack strategy
of an attacker is to find a sparse a, such that y = BI¯a.
Then, using l1 relaxations for sparse vector estimation [19],
[20], [22], we introduce the following optimization problem
to model the sparse false data injection attack:
minimize ∥a∥1
subject to y =BI¯a. (11)
(11) is called basis pursuit and can be employed to find a
sparse solution vector c [19], [20], [22]. In order to solve
the optimization problem above using ADMM [16], (11) is
formulated as
minimize I(a) + ∥β∥1
subject to a −β = 0, (12)
where I(a) is the indicator function for {a ∈ RN ∶ y = BI¯a}
and β ∈ RN is the optimization variable. The sparsity of a is
governed by ∥β∥1 using a scalar real number λ > 0, which
is a regularization parameter. Moreover, in order to reduce
the probability of the attack being detected, ∥y −BI¯a∥2
2
can
be used as a cost function which results in the optimization
problem
minimize ∥y −BI¯a∥2
2
+ λ∥β∥1
subject to a −β = 0. (13)
Problem (13) is a LASSO optimization [22] and can be solved
via ADMM [16] as follows:
Algorithm 1 (LASSO via ADMM):
● INPUT:
– Projection matrix defined by secure set BI¯
– Projected vector containing injected data y
– Penalty parameter ρ
– Maximum number of iterations t′
● OUTPUT:
– Attack vector candidate a def= at
4● PROCEDURE:
1) Initialize t = 0, β = 0 and u = 0
2) Compute ridge regression with penalty parameter ρ:
at+1 = ((BI¯)TBI¯ + ρI)
−1
((BI¯)Ty + ρ(βt − ut))
(14)
3) Perform soft thresholding defined by proximity op-
erator Πκ(φ) = (φ−κ)+ − (−φ−κ)+, where (φ)+ =
max(φ,0):
βt+1 = Πλ/ρ(ut + at+1) (15)
4) Update:
ut+1 = ut + at+1 − βt+1 (16)
5) Return to step 2 if a stopping criterion is not satisfied
and t < t′
2) Selective Targeted Attacks: The previous approach pro-
vides an implicit control of the sparsity of a using parameter
λ. In the following, the sparsity is explicitly controlled by
introducing the constraint ∥a∥0 ≤ k in (11) in the optimization
problem as
minimize ∥y −BI¯a∥2
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subject to ∥a∥0 ≤ k . (17)
This optimization problem can also be solved via ADMM
with a minor modification of Algorithm 1. Specifically, hard-
thresholding Π∗
λ/ρ(at+1 +ut) is employed in the update of β,
such that k largest magnitude elements of ut + at+1 are kept
and zeros are assigned to the remaining elements [16].
B. Strategic Sparse Attacks
In this section, we propose two algorithms to compute the
attack vector c based on the formulations of LASSO Attacks
and Selective Sparse Attacks for the strategic sparse attack
model case introduced by Kim and Poor [4]. To this end,
we first redefine the sparse data injection attack problem for
ADMM. Then, we solve the optimization problems using
LASSO and Regressor Selection algorithms.
1) Strategic Sparse Attacks with LASSO: In Strategic
Sparse Attacks, a row-wise decomposition of the Jacobian
measurement matrix is employed based on the set A of
attacked measurement indices denoting the meters to which
an attacker has access, and the set S of secure measure-
ment indices, i.e., the indices of meters which cannot be
tampered by an attacker. Specifically, a sub-matrix HS =
(Hji,∶,⋯HjN−∣S∣,∶), ∀ji ∈ S, of H is constructed in order to
represent the secure measurements, where Hji,∶ is the ji-th
row of H, such that HSc = 0. Similarly, sub-matrix HA is
defined for attacked measurements. As a result, the attacker’s
strategy is defined to find a solution c to the following
optimization problem:
minimize ∥HAc∥0
subject to HSc = 0 ,
∥c∥∞ ≥ ψ ,
(18)
where ψ ≥ 0 is a given constant [4].
Define hi as the i-th column vector of H, the sub-matrix
Hi ∈ RN×(D−1) formed by removing the i-th column of H,
and σi ∈ RD−1 formed by removing the i-th variable of
c. Following these definitions, the strategic sparse attack is
defined as
minimize ∥HAi σi + hAi ∥1
subject to HSi σi + hSi = 0 . (19)
Since H and c are sparse, it follows that the problem can
be reformulated as
minimize ∥σi∥1
subject to HSi σi + hSi = 0 . (20)
Since (20) is a LASSO problem, we reformulate (20) as an
ADMM optimization problem as follows:
minimize ∥HSi σi + hSi ∥22 + λ∥θi∥1
subject to σi − θi = 0 , (21)
where θi ∈ RD−1 is the optimization variable. In order to solve
(21), Algorithm 1 can be employed with inputs HSi , y = 1
and θi. This procedure is repeated for i = 1, ...,D in order to
compute c = (c1, ...,cD).
2) Selective Strategic Sparse Attacks: As discussed in the
previous section, the sparsity of ci can be bounded explic-
itly by converting (20) to the equivalent regressor selection
problem given by
minimize ∥HSi σi + hSi ∥22
subject to ∥σi∥0 ≤ k . (22)
In this formalism, we relax the constraint in HSc = 0 and
introduce a sparsity constraint in the construction of attack
vectors c, such that we compute an attack vector with at most k
non-zero elements. The solution to (22) is the same as the one
proposed for (21) except for substituting the soft thresholding
operator in step 3 by a hard thresholding.
C. Computational Complexity of Centralized Sparse Attacks
The optimization problems of the centralized sparse attacks
are solved using Algorithm 1. The computational complexity
of the algorithm is dominated by the attack vector update
step in (14) which solves a ridge regression problem [23].
Therefore, the computational complexity of the algorithm is
Υ1 ∈ O(t′α3), where
1) α = min(N, ∣I¯ ∣) for targeted attacks given in Section
III.A, and
2) α =min(N,D−1), for strategic attacks given in Section
III.B.
Note that, the computational complexity of the algorithm is
increased by an additional term D (the dimension of the attack
vector) to O(t′Dα3) for strategic attacks, since the algorithm
is implemented D times.
In the implementation, the running or iteration time t′ can
be relaxed by using performance based early stopping criteria
as suggested in [16].
5IV. DISTRIBUTED AND COLLABORATIVE SPARSE STATE
VECTOR ESTIMATION
A sparse state vector estimation model, called Distributed
Sparse State Vector Estimation, is first introduced in order
to estimate the state vectors under attack on the network
measurements using an instance distributed LASSO algorithm.
In the second model, called Collaborative Sparse State Vector
Estimation, we assume that the topological information of the
network and the measurements are available to the network
operator. However, the network operator can choose to process
different groups of state vectors using the Group LASSO
algorithm. We solve the optimization problems using the
ADMM algorithm.
A. Distributed Sparse State Vector Estimation
Measurements are distributed in the network and usually
form clusters following the topological properties of the
network. Additionally, observation vectors and measurement
matrices are partitioned into G blocks denoted by Gi with
∣Gi∣ = Ni for i = 1, . . . ,G. As a result, the attacks can also be
partitioned. Taking this into account, (3) can be rewritten as
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
z˜1
⋮
z˜G
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
H1
⋮
HG
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
x +
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a1
⋮
aG
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
n1
⋮
nG
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (23)
where z˜i ∈ RNi is the measurement observed in the i-th cluster
of nodes through measurement matrix Hi ∈ RNi×D and noise
ni ∈ RNi , and which is under attack ai ∈ RNi with i = 1, ...,G.
For each cluster, we consider the penalty function
fi = ∥z˜i −Hix˜i∥22 , (24)
where x˜i is the state vector estimated at cluster i. Note that
f ≡ ∥z˜ −Hx˜∥22 =
G
∑
i=1
fi.
Therefore, we can write the distributed optimization problem
in the following way:
minimize
G
∑
i=1
fi + g(β) (25)
subject to x˜i −β = 0, i = 1, ...,G , (26)
where β ∈ RD is the optimization variable, g(β) = λ∥β∥1
is the regularization function and λ ∈ R is the regularization
parameter, which controls the sparsity of the solution vec-
tor. Since network operators accessing the local data should
agree on the estimated state vector, we introduce a consensus
constraint in (26). In other words, (26) is considered as a
global consensus problem in which β is used as the global
optimization variable.
We solve (26) using an ADMM implementation as described
in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 2 (Distributed Estimation via ADMM):
● INPUT:
– Projection matrix H
– State measurements z˜
– Set of clusters {Gi}Gi=1
– Penalty parameter ρ
– Maximum number of iterations t′
● OUTPUT:
– Estimated state vector x˜ ≡ x˜t
● PROCEDURE:
1) Initialize t = 0, β0 = 0, u0 = 0.
2) For i = 1, . . . ,G compute the Tikhonov-regularized
least squares estimate with penalty parameter ρ
given by
x˜t+1i = (HTi Hi + ρI)−1 (HTi z˜i + ρ(βt − uti)) .
(27)
3) Perform a soft thresholding given by
βt+1 = Π λ
ρG
( 1
G
G
∑
i=1
(x˜t+1i + uti)) , (28)
where the ℓ1 proximity operator is defined as
Πκ(φ) = (φ − κ)+ − (−φ − κ)+ (29)
and (φ)+ =max(φ,0).
4) For i = 1, . . . ,G update
ut+1i = uti + x˜t+1i − βt+1. (30)
5) Return to step 2 if the halting criterion is not
satisfied and t < t′.
Note that Hi is a sparse matrix or vector (depending on Gi).
Still, (HTi Hi + ρI) is invertible since ρ > 0.
Algorithm and optimization variables are initialized in the
first step of the algorithm. In the second step, each network
operator computes a local estimate using Tikhonov-regularized
least squares [24], [25]. Then the local estimates are gathered
to update the global variable β in the third step. Finally, the
updated β is distributed or broadcast to the clusters to update
the dual variables ui, ∀i = 1, . . . ,G, in the fourth step, and
the halting criterion is checked in the last step.
B. Collaborative Sparse State Vector Estimation
In the distributed sparse attacks scenario, measurements
are assumed to be distributed across clusters and operators
have access only to local measurements. Alternatively, when
collective sparse attacks are considered, operators know the
whole topology of the network and the Jacobian measurement
matrix H. However, in a distributed framework operators
observe a subset of state vector variables, i.e., each operator
may observe different groups of buses.
In this setting, the observation model (3) can be rewritten
as
z˜ = [Hˆ1⋯HˆG]
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x1
⋮
xG
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+ a + n , (31)
where z˜ ∈ RN is the measurement vector, xi ∈ RDi is the
state vector, n ∈ RN is a noise vector and Hˆi ∈ RN×Di is
the Jacobian measurement submatrix formed by selecting the
columns given by the indices of the subset of state variables
6assigned to cluster i. Given this structure, the optimization
problem can be stated as
minimize ∥Hx˜ − z˜∥2
2
+ λ
G
∑
i=1
∥x˜i∥2. (32)
By introducing an optimization variable v ∈ RD, it follows
that
minimize ∥Hv − z˜∥22 + λ
G
∑
i=1
∥x˜i∥2 (33)
subject to x˜i − vˆi = 0, i = 1, ...,G , (34)
is equivalent to (32), where vˆi is the estimate of v for x˜i [16].
In order to solve (34), the proposed ADMM implementation
is described below.
Algorithm 3 (Collaborative Estimation via ADMM):
● INPUT:
– Projection matrix H
– State measurements z˜
– Set of clusters {Gi}Gi=1
– Penalty parameter ρ
– Maximum number of iterations t′
● OUTPUT:
– Estimated state vector x˜ ≡ x˜t
● PROCEDURE:
1) Initialize t = 0, β0 = 0, v0 = 0, θ0 = 0 and x˜0 = 0.
2) For i = 1, . . . ,G compute
x˜t+1i = argmin
x˜i
(ρ∥θti∥22 + λ∥x˜i∥2) , (35)
where θti = Hˆi (x˜i − x˜ti) − v¯t +Hx˜t + ut and
Hx˜
t = 1
G ∑
G
i=1 Hˆix˜
t
i.
3) Update
v¯t+1 = 1
G + ρ
(z˜ + ρHx˜t+1 + ρut), (36)
ut+1 = ut +Hx˜t+1 − v¯t+1. (37)
4) Return to step 2 if the halting criterion is not
satisfied and t < t′.
V. DISTRIBUTED AND COLLECTIVE SPARSE ATTACKS
In Section III, we introduced centralized sparse attack
methods. In this section, two distributed attack models are
proposed in order to employ sparse attacks in a distributed
framework. For this purpose, the structure of the measurements
and the attack vectors is redefined, followed by a formulation
of the false data injection problem as a distributed sparse
optimization problem.
The proposed distributed attack models are motivated by
two distributed attack scenarios.
1) In Distributed Sparse Attacks, measurements are as-
sumed to be distributed in the network and may form
clusters following the topological properties of the net-
work. Therefore, different attackers located in different
clusters can construct attack vectors by just analyzing
the local measurements observed in the clusters.
2) Collective Sparse Attacks model assumes that attackers
know the whole topology of the network and the Jaco-
bian measurement matrix H. However, in this case the
attacks are directed at a group of state vector variables
distributed in the network, i.e., each attack injects false
data into the state vector variables of the corresponding
cluster.
Although linear sparse attacks are considered for the imple-
mentation of distributed attacks in this work, the proposed par-
allelization and distributed processing strategies can be used
as design patterns for developing distributed sparse targeted
false data injection attacks and strategic sparse attacks.
A. Distributed Sparse Attacks
A linear sparse attack model is considered, in which given
an attack vector, a, the attack strategy is to find a sparse
injection vector, c, such that a = Hc [1]. Using an ℓ1
relaxation for sparse vector estimation [19], [20], [22], the
following optimization problem is considered:
minimize ∥c∥1
subject to a =Hc. (38)
As noted before, measurements are assumed to be dis-
tributed in the network and may form clusters following
the topological properties of the network. Similar to the
partitioning presented in the previous section, the Jacobian
measurement matrix is partitioned into G number of subma-
trices, which results in a partitioning of the attack vector given
by
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a1
⋮
aG
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
H1
⋮
HG
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
c. (39)
Note that, (39) can also be employed in the distributed false
data vector construction described in (23).
In order to solve (38) in the distributed form set by (39)
using a distributed optimization algorithm, the loss function is
assumed to be separable, such that
fi = ∥ai −Hici∥22. (40)
Note that, ∑Gi=1 fi = f . Moreover, the optimization problem
(38) is assumed to be feasible [16]. Therefore, the distributed
optimization problem for (38) can be reformulated as
minimize ∑Gi=1 fi + g(φ) (41)
subject to ci −φ = 0, i = 1, ...,G , (42)
where φ ∈ RNi is the optimization variable, g(φ) = λ∥φ∥1
is the regularization function and λ ∈ R is the regularization
parameter which controls the sparsity of the solution vector.
Interestingly, the optimization problem (42) is the same as the
one posed in (26) and therefore, Algorithm 2 can be used to
solve it.
7B. Collective Sparse Attacks
The collective sparse attacks model assumes that attackers
know the whole topology of the network and the Jacobian
measurement matrix H. However, in this case the attacks
are directed at a group of state vector variables, i.e., each
attack injects false data into the state vector variables of
the corresponding cluster. Within this setting, (38) can be
rearranged as
a = [Hˆ1⋯HˆG]
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
c1
⋮
cG
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (43)
where the injection vector ci ∈ RDi is computed by the i-th
attacker using Jacobian measurement submatrix Hˆi for i =
1, ...,G. Following this decomposition, the optimization can
be posed as
minimize ∥Hc − a∥2
2
+ λ
G
∑
i=1
∥ci∥2. (44)
Introducing the optimization variables, ψ ∈ RD, yields a new
formulation
minimize ∥Hψ − a∥22 + λ
G
∑
i=1
∥ci∥2 (45)
subject to ci − ψˆi = 0 , i = 1, ...,G , (46)
where ψˆi is the estimate of ψ for ci [16]. In the same fashion
as with the previous problem, the optimization problem (46)
is the same as (32) and therefore, Algorithm 3 can be used to
solve it.
VI. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF DISTRIBUTED
ALGORITHMS
We solve the distributed optimization problems using two
main approaches, namely measurement distributed and at-
tribute distributed optimization as given in Algorithm 2 and
Algorithm 3 respectively. In the measurement distributed ap-
proach, we assume that the measurements are distributed and
the local solutions of the optimization algorithms are computed
in the clusters. In the attribute distributed approach, we assume
that the state or attack vector variables are distributed and local
estimates are computed in the clusters.
If we ignore communication times required to gather and
broadcast the locally estimated vectors x˜i and local variables
ui, then the computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is
dominated by the x˜i-update step in (27), ∀i = 1, . . . ,G. Since
the partitioned Jacobian matrix Hi is used in (27), the compu-
tational complexity of (27) is O(α3i ), where αi =min(Ni,D)
in each cluster Gi. Then, the complexity of Algorithm 2 is
Υ2 ∈ max(t′O(α31), . . . , t′O(α3G)), since a central processor
which employs the third step of the algorithm should wait
to gather all the local estimates from the processors in the
clusters. If we define the maximum communication complexity
of gathering the local data as Υg and that of broadcasting
as Υb, then the complexity of Algorithm 2 is increased to
Υ2 +Υg +Υb.
Similarly, G parallel regularized least squares problems
are solved in Gi variables in the x˜i-update step (35) of
Algorithm 3. Since data partitioning by attribute is employed,
the computational complexity of (35) is O(α3i ), where αi =
min(N,Di). Similarly, the complexity of Algorithm 3 is
Υ3 ∈ max(t′O(α31), . . . , t′O(α3G)), and the communication
cost increases the complexity to Υ3 +Υg +Υb.
In the implementations, several practical tricks such as
caching can be used to decrease the computational complexity
of the local optimization algorithms (27) and (35). For further
details, please refer to [16].
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the validity of the proposed algorithms is
assessed by numerically evaluating the performance of the
algorithms for IEEE 9-Bus, IEEE 30-Bus, IEEE 57-Bus and
IEEE 118-Bus test systems [21]. For each data point 100
realizations are simulated. For all simulation results, λ is fixed
as [16]
λ = Cλmax, (47)
where C is a constant, λmax = ∥Hz˜∥∞ for distributed sparse
state vector estimation methods, and λmax = ∥Ha∥∞ for
distributed attack models. In addition, λmax can be considered
as a critical value of the regularization parameter λ above
which the estimated state and attack vectors take zero values.
Consequently, C determines the sparsity of the solutions of the
optimization problems and the number of iterations required to
obtain the solutions, i.e. the estimated state and attack vectors.
For that reason, an optimal λˆ or Cˆ is computed by analyzing
the solution (or regularization) path of the optimization algo-
rithms using a given training dataset. A detailed analysis of
the impact of C on the number of algorithm iterations required
to obtain an optimal solution is given in [16] for ADMM
implementations of LASSO type algorithms. We choose the
penalty parameter as ρ = 1, the absolute tolerance as 10−4,
the relative tolerance as 10−2 and set the maximum number
of iterations t′ = 10000.
In the experiments, it is assumed that the attacker has
access to k measurements. For each realization, a k-sparse
attack vector, a, is randomly generated by selecting the non-
zero indices following a uniform distribution and Gaussian
distributed amplitudes with the same mean and variance values
as z. For distributed instances of the problem, the number
of clusters, G, is uniformly distributed from the set of all
prime divisors of N . On the other hand, for the collaborative
instances, G is chosen from the set of all prime divisors of D.
A. Results for Centralized Data Injection Attacks
In order to assess the performance, the following parameters
are computed in the simulations:
1) Pr(aˆi ≠ 0,ai ≠ 0) or simply Pr(aˆ′i,a′i), which is the
probability of correctly constructing an attack variable
aˆi ≠ 0 of a false data injection vector a.
2) Pr(aˆi = 0,ai = 0) or simply Pr(aˆi,ai), which is the
probability of correctly constructing a secure variable
aˆi = 0 of a false data injection vector a.
Since Pr(aˆ′i,a′i) + Pr(aˆi,a′i) = 1 and Pr(aˆi,ai) +
Pr(aˆ′i,ai) = 1, probabilities of incorrect constructions can
be computed from the results.
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Fig. 1: False data vector construction probabilities for for TLA
and TSA.
False data construction probabilities of Targeted LASSO
Attacks (TLA), Strategic LASSO Attacks (SLA), Targeted
Selective Attacks (TSA) and Strategic Selective Attacks (SSA)
are compared in the following.
In Figure 1, the experiments for TLA and TSA are analyzed
and the changes of false data vector construction probabilities
are depicted for a varying number of attack variables, k
N
, for
each test system. The construction probabilities do not increase
or decrease smoothly for TLA (Figures 1.a and 1.b.), since λ
is computed dynamically by (47) for each realization and test
system. Therefore, sparseness is not explicitly controlled in
LASSO Attacks. On the other hand, the dynamic computation
of λ using (47) enables estimation of the sparseness of the
attacks and the randomness in H. Therefore, the false data
vector a is constructed with similar probabilities independent
of the test system and sparsity level k
N
of the attack vectors
in the TLA case. For instance, Pr(aˆ′i,a′i) obtains values
in the range [0.5,0.7] in Figure 1.a and Pr(aˆi,ai) obtains
values in the range [0.3,0.5] in Figure 1.b. Since sparseness
can be controlled in Selective Attacks, a smooth change of
the construction probabilities of false data vector variables is
observed for TSA in Figure 1.c and Figure 1.d.
Note that, if the regularization parameter for LASSO is
optimized, the solution vectors for LASSO and Regressor
selection algorithms coincide [16]. In Figure 2, it can be seen
that similar solutions are attainable, i.e. both methods construct
similar attack vectors. For instance, we observe that the
attacked variable construction probabilities increase similarly
in Figures 2.a and 2.c, while secure variable construction
probabilities decrease similarly in Figures 2.b and 2.d for SLA
and SSA.
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Fig. 2: False data vector construction probabilities for SLA
and SSA.
B. Results for Attack Detection using Distributed Sparse State
Vector Estimation
In this work, our primary interest from the network oper-
ator’s point of view is the distributed estimation of the state
vectors. In this section, we analyze the proposed state vector
estimation methods by employing them for the attack detection
problem using a modified Normalized Residual Test (NRT)
procedure [6].
In the attack detection procedure, we first estimate the state
vectors xˆ using the algorithms proposed in Section III. Then,
the error of the system is computed as ∥z−Hxˆ∥2
2
and the resid-
ual of an observed measurement i is given by ∥zi − (Hxˆ)i ∥22,
where (⋅)i denotes the i-th element of the argument vector.
Following the classical detection criterion, it is declared that
the observation i is attacked if ∥zi − (Hxˆ)i∥22 > τ . Since
our goal is to detect the attacks on specific measurements,
we do not remove the attacked measurement vectors at each
iteration of the algorithm unlike the NRT method proposed
in [6]. In addition, such a removal process disturbs the data
space. Therefore, the proposed estimation methods should be
re-implemented and the regularization parameters should be
re-estimated on the updated datasets, leading to additional
computational costs.
In the experiments, both algorithms operate with fixed pa-
rameter C = 1
2
for the regularization parameter λ. In addition,
τ is chosen as 2ξn∥I −H(HTΣ−1n H)−1HTΣ−1n ∥∞, where ξn
and Σn are the variance and the covariance matrix of the noise
n in (1) respectively, as suggested in [26].
In this section, we construct the attack vectors using Ran-
dom False Data Injection Attacks when the attacker has access
to any k meters to construct k-sparse attack vectors a, as
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(b) Accuracy for the collective case.
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(d) Precision for the collective case.
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(f) Recall for the collective case.
Fig. 3: Experiments for the IEEE 57-bus test system with various G values.
suggested by Liu, Ning and Reiter [1].
Performance indices Precision (Prec), Recall (Rec) and
Accuracy (Acc) are defined as
Prec = tp
tp+fp
, Rec = tp
tp+fn
, Acc = tp+tn
tp+tn+fn+fp
, (48)
where true positive (tp), true negative (tn), false positive (fp),
and false negative (fn) are defined in Table II. For instance,
tp represents the number of attacked measurements that are
correctly detected. On the other hand, fp represents the number
of secure measurements that are wrongly declared as attacked.
Note that, Prec is equal to Pr(aˆi = ai), which is the
probability that a network operator can successfully detect k
specific attacks for all aˆi ≠ 0.
TABLE II: Definitions of tp, fp, tn, and fn
Attacked Secure
Classified as Attacked tp fp
Classified as Secure fn tn
Results for different numbers of measurement clusters, G,
are considered in Figure 3. In this experiment, each operator
has access to locally observed measurements, state vectors and
submatrices. The simulated cases are G = ∣N ∣ and G = ∣D∣, for
distributed and collective state estimation algorithms respec-
tively. Therefore, G = ∣N ∣ and G = ∣D∣ are the extreme cases
for distributed processing scenarios. However, the algorithms
have similar performance for different values of G in Figure 3,
which shows that the optimality loss with respect to centralized
strategies is small in the simulated settings.
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Fig. 4: Distributed estimation performance indices for IEEE
9-bus and IEEE 57-bus test systems.
Figure 4 shows the results of distributed and collective state
vector estimation algorithms for G = 1. Note that, the case
G = 1 represents a centralized processing scenario in which
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Fig. 5: Experiments for the IEEE 57-bus test system.
all of the observed measurements and the whole Jacobian
measurement matrix are available to network operators. It
can be seen that the performance values of distributed and
collective estimation methods are similar for the IEEE-9-bus
test system in Figure 4.a and Figure 4.b respectively. However,
the results in Figures 4.c and 4.d show that for low values
of k/N the precision fluctuates and stabilizes around 0.9 as
k/N increases for the IEEE-57-bus test system. In addition,
the slopes of the curves representing the increases of accuracy
and recall values are slightly smaller in Figures 4.c and 4.d
than the ones for the IEEE-9-bus test system case.
C. Results for Distributed and Collective Sparse Attacks
In order to measure the detectability of the attacks from the
perspective of the network operators, Error = ∥zi−(Hxˆ)i∥22 is
considered. Throughout this section, both algorithms operate
with fixed parameter C = 1
2
.
In Figure 5, the results of the distributed attack experiments
for the IEEE-57-bus test system are shown. Remarkably, the
proposed algorithms are capable of successfully injecting data
with high probability for a large range of sparsity ranges.
However, it can be seen in Figures 5.a and 5.b that Pr(aˆ′i,a′i)
decreases and Error increases as G decreases. This is due
to the fact that the optimization is very sensitive to the
optimization of the regularization parameter λ. Interestingly,
in the simulation settings evaluated for this paper, it has been
observed that the proposed algorithms are more robust to varia-
tions of λ when smaller values of G are considered. It is known
[27] that the optimization of the regularization parameter in
the centralized case is hard. Surprisingly, as the fragmentation
of the optimization problem increases, i.e., for lower values
of G, the performance of the algorithm is less sensitive to
the tuning of the regularization parameter. For instance, the
injection vectors are computed and the optimization variables
are updated locally in each group with respect to a global
regularization parameter in distributed and collective attacks.
In other words, the group-wise local regularization paths (i.e.,
the set of solutions) are computed and used to approximate a
global regularization path. Since the paths of Group LASSO
are piecewise differentiable, approximating the global path by
the local paths may be a challenge as G increases. A solution
to this challenge is to compute group-wise parameters in an
adaptive scheme [28].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered centralized and distributed
models for sparse attack construction and state estimation
in the smart grid. For a centralized scenario, two methods,
LASSO Attacks and Selective Attacks, have been introduced
for the construction of false data vectors and attack vectors for
a given attack model. The presented methods are used in two
well-known attack models, Targeted and Strategic Attacks.
We have shown that Selective Attacks provide control of
the sparsity of the attack vectors, explicitly. Therefore, a con-
struction method has been proposed for false data and attack
vectors, which contain a given number of attacked and secure
variables. Incidentally, the randomness of the parameters of
the attack models may decrease the unobservability of the
attack vectors and the control for the construction of false data
vectors. For instance, random construction of the sub-matrices
in Targeted Attacks may inject additional randomness into the
probabilities of constructing false data vectors a.
For the case in which the distributed nature of the network
is considered, new distributed sparse state vector estimation
and attack detection methods have been introduced. In the
Distributed State Vector Estimation method, it is assumed
that the observed measurements are distributed in clusters in
the network. The state vectors are estimated using local data
measurements in the clusters by either local network operators
or PMUs. The estimates are then updated by centralized
processors. In Collaborative Sparse State Vector Estimation,
operators estimate a subset of variables of the state vectors.
Therefore, state vector variables are assumed to be distributed
in groups and accessed by the network operators locally. In this
scenario, network operators compute their local estimates and
send the estimated values to a centralized network operator in
order to update the estimated values.
In the experiments, it has been observed that both state
vector estimation methods perform similarly for a varying
number of attacks in different test systems. Besides, accuracy
and precision values of the proposed methods decrease as
the system size increases and the performance values do not
change as the number of clusters increases. In other words,
we can achieve similar performance when we implement the
algorithms in centralized (G = 1) and massively distributed
scenarios (G = N or G =D).
When the Distributed Sparse Attacks model is considered,
it is assumed that attackers process only local measurements
in order to achieve a consensus for attack vectors. In the
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Collective Sparse Attacks case, the topological information of
the network and the measurements is available to attackers.
However, the attackers employ attacks on variable groups of
state vectors.
It has been observed in the experiments that the Collective
Sparse Attacks model performs better than the Distributed
Sparse Attacks model for the construction of unobservable at-
tack vectors. Surprisingly, better performance of the algorithm
with higher G values is achieved than smaller G values when
larger systems are considered. This is due to the fact that one
of the challenges of the proposed methods is the estimation of
algorithm parameters, e.g., the maximum number of iterations
and the regularization parameter λ. For the case in which the
sparsity degree, k, of the solution vectors are known a priori,
regressor selection algorithms can be employed in order to
control the sparsity of the solutions.
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